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THE SEARCH FOR COHERENCE IN THE USE OF FOREIGN
COURT JUDGMENTS BY THE SUPREME COURT OF
IRELAND
Bruce Carolant
I. INTRODUCTION
The citation of decisions of foreign courts in the decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court has sparked controversy. This controversy flared in the
case of Lawrence v. Texas.' Justice Kennedy cited the decision of the
2European Court of Human Rights in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom in the
course of striking down a Texas statute that criminalized same-sex
sodomy.3 Justice Scalia criticized Justice Kennedy for citing the European
Court of Human Rights in interpreting the U.S. Constitution.
4
This paper attempts to offer some insight into the debate by exploring
the issue from a European perspective. Specifically, this paper explores
citation of decisions by "foreign" courts by the Supreme Court of the
Republic of Ireland in several well-known Irish cases.
There are a number of similarities between the U.S. and Irish
Constitutional systems. Ireland, a former British colony, inherited its
common law system from the United Kingdom upon attaining its
t Bruce Carolan, Head of School of Social Sciences and Legal Studies, Dublin Institute of
Technology. This paper is based on comments made at the 2004 University of Tulsa College of
Law Symposium: International Law and the 2003-04 Supreme Court Term: Building Bridges or
Constructing Barriers Between National, Foreign, and International Law? My thanks to
Professors Linda Lacey and Janet Levit and to the University of Tulsa College of Law for inviting
me to participate in this conference. My thanks to Dr. Fergus Ryan, Dublin Institute of
Technology, for valuable comments.
1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2. 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
3. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
4. Id. at 598.
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independence in 1922. Ireland has a written Constitution and a set of
enumerated personal rights similar to those contained in the first ten
amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The Constitutional courts of
Ireland employ interpretive methods familiar to a U.S. lawyer. Ireland, as
a former colony, jealously guards its sovereignty. In some ways, Ireland is
closer to the legal system of the U.S. than to the civil law systems of other
Member States of the European Union, which Ireland joined in 1973.
This paper explores the willingness of the Irish Supreme Court to
employ decisions of three "foreign" courts in interpreting the Irish
Constitution. These courts are the European Court of Human Rights, the
European Union Court of Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court. The
attitude of the Irish Supreme Court towards considering the decisions of
these three courts appears inconsistent. While the Irish Supreme Court
has been willing to consider decisions of the European Union Court of
Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court, the Irish Supreme Court has been
hostile to considering decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.
The difference in approach is partially, but not completely, explained
by reference to the Irish Constitution. The Irish Constitution expressly
privileges the law of the European Union over other forms of international
agreements However, from a Constitutional perspective, the decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court implicitly occupy the same position as decisions of
the European Court of Human Rights. The Irish Supreme Court should
be equally dismissive of decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court as they are of
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. The Irish Supreme
Court, however, grants far more deference to U.S. Supreme Court
decisions than it does to decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights.
What explains this seeming incoherence in approach? One must go
beyond the express provisions of the Irish Constitution to understand the
hostility of the Irish courts towards decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights. A full understanding of the willingness of the Irish courts
to consider citations of foreign courts depends, in part, on an
understanding of the unstated relationship between the Irish court and the
foreign courts. Where the relationship is horizontal - in the sense that the
Irish court cannot directly be overruled or deemed to have provided an
incorrect interpretation of the foreign law by the court whose decisions are
offered for consideration - the Irish court is open to considering the
foreign court's opinion. Where the relationship is vertical - in the sense
that the foreign court can give a conflicting interpretation of the foreign
law that will be regarded as superior to the Irish court interpretation - the
5. Art. 29, Constitution of Ireland, 1937.
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Irish Supreme Court is hostile to consideration of the foreign court's
decision.
Part II of this article reviews the relevant portions of the Irish
Constitution, and makes comparisons with analogous provisions of the
U.S. Constitution. Part III examines the relationship between the Irish
judicial system and "foreign" law. "Foreign" law is divided into
international law, foreign national law, and supranational law for purposes
of this examination. Part IV analyzes the attitude of the Irish Supreme
Court towards considering decisions of courts applying "foreign" law in the
context of several well-known Irish cases. Part V sets forth a tentative
premise for apparent inconsistency in the Irish Supreme Court's attitudes
towards decisions of courts applying foreign law. Part VI concludes the
article, with a brief observation on the possible relevance to a similar issue
in the U.S. Supreme Court.
II. IRISH CONSTITUTION
6
A. Background and Government Structure
The Republic of Ireland attained its independence from the United
Kingdom in 1922. The modern Irish Constitution is Bunreacht nah
tireann or Constitution of Ireland 1937. This Constitution was drafted
primarily by the Prime Minister of Ireland, Iamonn de Valera, with
considerable input from the Irish Roman Catholic Church The 1937
Constitution replaced the Constitution of the Irish Free State, which had
been adopted in 1922.
In adopting a written Constitution, Ireland rejected the traditions of
its former colonial master, the United Kingdom, which lacked and still
lacks a written Constitution. Ireland's adoption of a single document
comprising the national Constitution is closer to the experience of another
former British colony, the U.S.
There are similarities as well as differences between the forms of
government established by the modern Irish Constitution and the U.S.
Constitution. The Irish Constitution establishes a tripartite form of
government consisting of an executive, legislative, and judicial branch. On
the other hand, Ireland's Constitution retains aspects of the parliamentary
form of government found in the United Kingdom. For example, the
executive branch of government is not directly elected, as in the U.S.
6. For a general discussion of the Irish Constitution and its history, see FERGUS W.
RYAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2001).
7. Id. at 3.
20041
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
Instead, the party or parties who win the majority of seats in elections for
the legislative branch, as in the United Kingdom, form the executive.
(Coalition governments, consisting of two or more national parties, are the
norm in Ireland, as one party rarely attains an overall majority of available
seats in the legislature.)
As in the United Kingdom, the parties forming the executive branch
select the Prime Minister, or an Taoiseach, who, in essence, becomes the
official most closely resembling the U.S. President. (The President of
Ireland, currently Mary McAleese, largely holds a ceremonial post and is
in fact forbidden from giving an opinion on the political issues of the day.)
The Taoiseach must have been elected to one branch of the Irish
legislature, the Dail, which is the "lower" house of the Irish Parliament,
the Oireachtas, in order to be eligible for appointment. Thus, only a
relatively small number of voters - those who reside in the constituency in
which the Taoiseach runs for the Dail - actually vote for the official who
becomes Ireland's prime minister. (On the other hand, the entire
electorate of the Republic of Ireland votes for the largely ceremonial post
of Irish President who, ironically, comes from the United Kingdom, i.e.,
Northern Ireland, although she is an Irish citizen).
As in the U.S., the Irish legislature is divided into two branches. The
lower house is called the Dail. The upper house is called the Senate.
However, the powers of the Irish Senate more closely resemble those of
the United Kingdom's House of Lords. The Irish Senate, for instance,
lacks the power to prevent the adoption of legislation approved by the
lower house of the Irish legislature.
The Irish Constitution owes much to the U.S. Constitution.
Nevertheless, the resulting form of government is a hybrid, combining
elements of both the U.S. and United Kingdom systems of government. In
one important sense, however, the Irish Constitution is much closer to the
U.S. experience than that of the United Kingdom. The affinity of the Irish
Constitution to U.S. Constitutional principles is perhaps strongest in its
protection of individual rights.
1. Irish and U.S. Constitutions and Individual Rights
The Irish and U.S. Constitutions are similar in the sense that both
contain an enumeration of individual rights. Both U.S. and Irish
Constitutional law contain unstated personal rights. In the U.S. some of
these rights, such as privacy, emanate from a penumbra created by the
Constitution's enumerated rights. In Ireland these unenumerated rights
are said to flow from the Christian and democratic nature of the state and
inhere in individuals by virtue of their human personality. The Irish
Constitution expressly provides for judicial review of Irish legislation
[Vol. 12:1
THE SEARCH FOR COHERENCE
8
against the rights guaranteed by the Irish Constitution. Judicial
supremacy in the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution is a judicially-
created doctrine.9
Combined with this express provision of judicial review is strict
judicial observance of the separation of powers, and of a grant of exclusive
law-making power to the Irish legislature, the Oireachtas.'0 The remedy in
Ireland for a judicial determination of unconstitutionality typically is an
order striking down the offending legislation." The Irish constitutional
courts largely decline to order affirmative injunctive relief against the
government, such as that observed in court orders in the U.S.
2. Challenges to Constitutionality of Irish Legislation
At several points in its Constitutional history, Ireland has "inherited"
a set of pre-existing laws that might, or might not, pass scrutiny under a
later-adopted Constitution. For example, upon achieving independence in
1922, the new Free State of Ireland faced a choice. It could have rejected,
wholesale, the pre-existing body of law imposed upon it by the British
government, or it could adopt the bulk of those laws, subject to some type
of review against standards set forth in a written constitution.
The Free State of Ireland chose the latter option. The Free State
government largely adopted the legal structure established in Ireland by
the British Government, e.g., the court structure, the written laws, the
common law judicial system, and the division of the legal profession
between solicitors and barristers. However, unlike the British system, the
new Irish government adopted a written constitution, with an express
provision for judicial review." The new Irish Constitution acted as a type
of filter. All laws existing at the time of the creation of the Irish Free State
were deemed to be part of the newly established Irish legal order, provided
they did not offend against any provisions of the later adopted Irish
Constitution.
This same "screening" procedure was followed with the adoption of
the 1937 Irish Constitution. When the 1937 Irish Constitution was
adopted, there existed a body of statutory and common law, some of which
might have offended the terms of the newly adopted Constitution. The
1937 Constitution anticipated this possibility and provided that it would act
as a "screen" or "filter" through which pre-existing laws would be required
8. Id. at art. 34.3.2.
9. Marbury v. Madison,5 U.S. 137 (1803).
10. Id. at art. 15.2.1.
11. See id. at 15.4.2.
12. Art. 65, Constitution of the Irish Free State, 1922.
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to pass." Of course, legislation adopted after the enactment of the 1937
Constitution must also be in accordance with the Constitution. 14
The foregoing observations provide a domestic law framework for the
Irish courts' approach to issues of the constitutionality of Irish law. It
informs discussion relevant to this conference, namely, the willingness of
Constitutional courts to entertain arguments based at least partially on
"foreign" law, in the form of decisions of foreign courts. To complete the
picture, however, it is necessary to divide such foreign law into three
possible types: international law, foreign national law, and supranational
law. Having divided the potential source of foreign law judgments in this
way, it is necessary to consider the express constitutional position of
Ireland relative to two of these sources, namely international law, and
supranational law.
III. IRELAND AND "FOREIGN" LAW
A. The Irish Constitution and International Law
There are two distinctive aspects of the Irish Constitution relevant to
exploring the willingness of Irish Constitutional courts to entertain
arguments based on decisions of courts applying international law. First,
the Irish Constitution provides that only the legislature, or Oireachtas, has
the power to make law: "no other legislative authority has power to make
laws for the State.""' It follows that no "foreign" body, whether the British
Parliament or an international body, has power to legislate for Ireland.
This provision also contributes to the reluctance of the Irish Constitutional
courts to order affirmative injunctive relief, as this would be seen as
usurping the legislature's exclusive right to make law.
Elsewhere, the Irish Constitution provides that international
agreements to which Ireland is a party shall not become part of the
domestic Irish law unless and until such laws are incorporated into
domestic law by an act of the Irish legislature." The Irish position with
respect to international law is commonly referred to as "dualist," in which
domestic and international law are seen as occupying two separate and
independent spheres; international law penetrates domestic law only to the
extent that the Oireachtas adopts a piece of legislation formally
transposing international law into the domestic law. A corollary of this
13. See art. 50, Constitution of Ireland, 1937.
14. Id. at art. 15.4.1.
15. Id. at art. 15.2.
16. Id. at art. 29.6.
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view is a limitation on the ability of an individual to rely upon international
law in the Irish courts.
Several of Ireland's European neighbors, by contrast, subscribe to a
"monist" perspective on the relationship between international and
domestic law. Under a monist perspective, domestic and international law
both may be relied upon in the national courts. The relationship between
international and domestic law depends upon application of domestic
Constitutional law. For example, international law might be regarded as
superceded by later domestic law. But there is not a constitutionally-
created wall preventing reliance upon international law in the domestic
courts.
1. The Irish Constitution and Foreign National Law
The Irish Constitution does not expressly deal with the issue of the
influence of foreign national law, which would include judgments of
foreign national courts. However, logic dictates that foreign national law
should occupy approximately the same position as international law in the
Irish Constitutional order. The Irish Constitution provides that only the
legislature has power to make laws for Ireland, and that no other
legislative authority has power to make laws for the State." This Article
may be a response to Ireland's previous status as essentially a colony of
Great Britain, subject to the laws enacted by the British Parliament."'
However, it would apply also to laws enacted on the other side of the
Atlantic, whether these laws are "enacted" by the U.S. Congress or by the
U.S. Supreme Court.
In addition, the fact that international agreements do not become part
of Irish domestic law unless adopted by the Irish legislature would seem to
stand as a bulwark against other types of foreign law, such as foreign
national law. Unlike the international agreements that are the focus of the
Irish Constitution, 9 Ireland is not a party to and played no role in the
adoption of foreign national law. The constitutional argument for
rejecting foreign national law as a consideration in interpreting the Irish
Constitution is at least as strong as, if not stronger than, the argument for
relying upon international law in interpreting the Irish Constitution.
17. Id. at art. 15.2.
18. Technically, Ireland was not a colony of Great Britain, but was completely absorbed by and a
part of The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland,
19. Art. 29.6, Constitution of Ireland, 1937.
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2. Irish Courts and Supranational Law
The status of the law of the European Union in the Irish
Constitutional order differs from the express status of international law
and the implicit status of foreign national law. European Union law is a
species of international law, and under the Constitutional provisions
discussed thus far, would be rejected as a relevant source of authority in
interpreting the Irish Constitution. However, Irish Constitutional courts
accept the law of the European Union as a source of law that can be
invoked directly by individuals and which Irish courts are bound to
uphold. 2 Furthermore, the Irish courts regard European Union law as
supreme to domestic law, even to Irish Constitutional law."
The reasons for the direct effect and supremacy of European Union
law in Irish domestic courts differ depending upon the perspective from
which one examines the issue. Both perspectives reach the same
conclusion: European Union law has direct effect in Irish domestic courts
and is supreme to Irish domestic law. However, the reasoning differs. The
law of the European Union provides one explanation for the direct effect
and supremacy of European Union law. Irish domestic law provides
another explanation. This is a potential source of Constitutional tension
between the national Irish legal order and the supranational legal order of
the European Union.
Ireland joined the then European Economic Community (EEC) in
1973. The European Economic Community Treaty of 1957" and
subsequent treaties, on which Community law rested, required, among
other things, the immediate incorporation of Community law into the
domestic law of the Member States.
For example, what is now Article 249 (formerly Article 189) of the
European Community Treaty provided for the adoption of various types
23
of Community law, including regulations. With respect to regulations,
the Treaty provided, "A regulation shall have general application. It shall
be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
24
In addition, by 1973 the European Court of Justice had ruled that
Community Treaty Articles themselves, if they satisfied certain conditions,
had direct effect in the domestic laws of the Member States and were
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter EEC Treaty].
23. Id. at art. 189.
24. Id.
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supreme to the laws of the Member States, including the constitutional law
of the member state.25
The EEC Treaty and subsequent Treaty Articles, as well as
regulations adopted by the Community institutions, constituted a form of
international agreement and/or a law enacted by a legislative authority
other than the Irish Oireachtas. The Irish Constitution provides that
international agreements do not become part of domestic law without an
express incorporation of such law into the Irish law. Furthermore, the
Irish Constitution provides that no other legislative authority could enact
laws for Ireland.
How then did the Irish Constitutional order accommodate the
requirements of Community law that such law be given direct effect and
supremacy? The answer depends upon to whom one puts the question.
According to the European Court of Justice, it is the nature of
European Union law itself that accounts for the direct effect and
supremacy of European Union law. In the famous case of Van Gend en
Loos, the European Court of Justice wrote that the then European
Economic Community constituted a new legal order in international law,
which possessed both direct effect and, implicitly, supremacy in the
domestic laws of the Member States.26 This ruling was made without
regard to and quite independent of the constitutional law of the Member
States. In fact, the Court rejected the Advocate General's opinion that the
issue was properly one for the Member States to resolve under their
27
respective national Constitutions.
Ireland would provide a different explanation for the direct effect and
supremacy of the law of the European Union, grounded in the express
terms of the Irish Constitution. Ireland amended its Constitution by
referendum to accommodate its membership in the EEC. The amended
Constitution provides that laws enacted by the institutions of the
European Community, such as regulations, become part of Irish domestic•28
law without the need for transposing legislation by the Irish Oireachtas.
Article 29.4.10 further provides that such laws, as well as laws enacted by
the Irish government to fulfill commitments of membership in theS - 29
Community, are supreme to Irish law, including the Irish Constitution. It
25. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, 1963 E.C.R.
3.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Art. 29.4.10, Constitution of Ireland, 1937.
29. Id.
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achieves the latter result by providing that the Constitution cannot be used
to challenge the legality of either type of law.3°
Under the Irish perspective, the direct effect and supremacy of
European Union law could be eliminated by the repeal of the relevant
constitutional law attributing such qualities to European Union law.
Under the perspective of the European Court of Justice, however, the
direct effect and supremacy of European Union law undoubtedly is seen as
a consequence of European Union law, which occurred irrevocably upon
Irish accession to the EEC 1973. Thus, there is the potential for a
national/supranational constitutional crisis, should Ireland ever seek to
revoke or revise its national constitution regarding the direct effect and
supremacy of European Union law.
The foregoing provides a backdrop against which to undertake a
close reading of several high-profile Irish Constitution cases, in which
arguments were presented to the Irish Supreme Court that invoked, if only
by analogy, decisions of courts applying foreign national law, such as the
U.S. Supreme Court, or decisions of courts applying international law,
such as the European Court of Human Rights. The next section looks at
several such cases.
However, reference by the Irish Supreme Court to decisions of the
supranational European Union Court of Justice constitutes a special case
in the analysis. This situation will be examined first.
IV. REFERENCE TO "FOREIGN" COURT DECISIONS BY THE IRISH
SUPREME COURT
A. Irish Supreme Court and European Union Court of Justice
The Irish Supreme Court has shown great deference to the law of the
European Union, and to the decisions of the European Court of Justice.
For example, in Campus Oil Ltd. v. Minister of Industry & Energy (No.2)
the Supreme Court expressly acknowledged the supremacy of European
Union law over Irish law, including the Irish Constitution." In that case,
one of the parties had appealed against a decision of the Irish court to
make a preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice, 2 a
procedure explained in more detail below. The Supreme Court held that
such an order could not be appealed, even though Article 34.3.3 of the
Constitution of Ireland provides that a party has a right to appeal all
30. Id.
31. [1983] I.R. 88 (Ire.).
32. Id.
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decisions of the Irish High Court to the Irish Supreme Court.33 This
deference to European Union law exceeded what was required under
European Union law itself, as the European Court of Justice subsequently
held that the law of the European Union did not preclude the appealability
of such orders of reference.34
The Irish Supreme Court will apply the law of the European Union in
an action brought before it. The Irish Supreme Court will not, generally
speaking, undertake to interpret the law of the European Union as it
applies in a particular case. That is, the Irish Supreme Court will
unquestioningly apply an interpretation of the European Court of Justice
in a case, but will not undertake to interpret European Union law in the
absence of a definitive ruling by the European Court of Justice.
Mr. Justice Griffin described this state of affairs in the case of Campus
Oil Ltd. when he wrote, "it would be highly undesirable, to put it at its
lowest, for this Court to interpret those [directly-effective Treaty] articles
in anticipation of the rulings of the [European] Court of Justice. ... It is
for the [European] Court of Justice to interpret the provisions of the
Treaty, and it is for our Courts to apply it."35
Thus, on the spectrum of the relationship between the Irish Supreme
Court and the decisions of courts interpreting "foreign" law, the decisions
of the European Union Court of Justice occupy the high end of Irish
Supreme Court deference to these decisions. With respect to these
decisions, the Irish Supreme Court abdicates its core judicial function of
interpreting the law that is directly applicable in the Court. Of course, the
express provisions of the Irish Constitution account for a significant
portion of this deference. However, as demonstrated by Campus Oil,
3 6
where the Irish Supreme Court erroneously ruled that the law of the
European Union precluded an appeal from an order making a preliminary
reference to the European Court of Justice, the Irish Supreme Court's
deference goes beyond what is strictly required under the Irish
Constitution and European Union law.
B. Irish Supreme Court and Decisions of the United States Supreme Court
There have been a number of cases before the Irish Supreme Court in
which the parties have cited decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Perhaps
the best examples of this practice are in cases pertaining to a
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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Constitutional right of privacy, such as Norris v. The Attorney Genera
and McGee v. The Attorney General.38 Decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court have also been cited in cases dealing with freedom of religion.
Perhaps the best known of these cases is Quinn's Supermarket v. The
Attorney General.39 Although the success of the plaintiffs in these cases
varied (and it was most often plaintiffs who cited these U.S. Supreme
Court decisions), the approach of the Irish Supreme Court was consistent
across these cases.
I will provide a brief overview of the facts of Norris, McGee, and
Quinn's Supermarket before examining these cases in the context of the
Irish Supreme Court's willingness to consider foreign judgments.
In Norris, the plaintiff, David Norris - a Trinity College Lecturer and
Joycean Scholar (and, later, a member of the Irish Senate) - represented
by barrister Mary Robinson (later to become President of Ireland and the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights) brought a lawsuit
to challenge sections 61 and 62 of the Offenses Against the Person Act,
1861, and section 11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885.40 These
laws, inherited from the British legal system, outlawed, among other
things, male-male sexual acts. Specifically, sections 61 and 62 of the
Offenses Against the Person Act criminalized "buggery" and provided for
a maximum sentence of life imprisonment with hard labor.4' Section 11 of
the Criminal Law Amendment Act outlawed gross indecency between
males.42 (Oscar Wilde had been sentenced to prison in the United
Kingdom in the late 19' Century for violating the latter statute.)
Norris relied upon provisions of the Irish Constitution pertaining to,
inter alia, personal dignity and the right of privacy. In support of these
latter arguments, Norris cited decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court,
particularly Stanley v. Georgia4 and Griswold v. Connecticut.45 He also
cited relevant portions of the European Convention on Human Rights,
most particularly Article 8, pertaining to the right of privacy.46 Finally,
37. [1984] I.R. 36 (Ire.).
38. [1974] I.R. 284 (Ire.).
39. [1972] I.R. 1 (Ire.).
40. [1984] I.R. 36 (Ire.).
41. Offences Against the Person Act 1861, §§ 61-62.
42. Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885, § 11.
43. Norris, [19841 I.R. 36 (Ire.).
44. 394 U.S. 1 (1969).
45. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
46. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for
signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1955) [hereinafter Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights].
[Vol. 12:1
THE SEARCH FOR COHERENCE
Norris cited to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom47 which had considered a challenge to the
same laws challenged by Norris.
In McGee v. The Attorney General, a woman who had been advised
against any further pregnancies by her physician challenged Irish laws
pursuant to which certain contraceptives had been seized by Irish customs
authority." The plaintiff cited provisions of the Irish Constitution relating
to personal dignity and the right of privacy. In support of her arguments,
plaintiff relied heavily upon the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Griswold
v. Connecticut,5° establishing a marital right of privacy.
Finally, in Quinn's Supermarket v. The Attorney General, plaintiffs
challenged an Irish law which restricted the hours of operation of butcher
shops, but which created an exception for shops selling kosher meat.5 The
plaintiffs relied upon provisions of Article 44 of the Irish Constitution
which provide that "[tihe State shall not impose any disabilities or make
any discrimination on the ground of religious profession, belief or status."52
In support of their claim, the plaintiffs cited decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court, including McGowan v. Maryland.53
The outcome of the particular cases is less significant than an
examination of the approach by the Irish Supreme Court to the citation of
authority from the U.S. Supreme Court in support of claims raised under
the Irish Constitution. The Irish Supreme Court was open to
consideration of U.S. Supreme Court decisions. A number of Irish
Supreme Court Justices employed the same judicial interpretive
techniques when considering the U.S. Supreme Court decisions as they
would in considering previous cases of the Irish Supreme Court. That is,
these Justices argued by analogy, or sought to distinguish the facts of the
U.S. Supreme Court decisions from the facts before the Irish court or
argued that there were significant differences in the principles being
compared. They debated these issues among themselves in their opinions.
In none of these Irish cases, however, did a single Irish Supreme Court
justice reject out of hand the authority of a foreign national court applying
non-Irish law, when considering interpretation on the relevant provisions
of Irish Constitutional law.
47. 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23-24 (1981).
48. [19741 I.R. 284 (Ire.).
49. Id.
50. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
51. [1972] I.R. 1 (Ire.).
52. Art. 44.2.3, Constitution of Ireland, 1937.
53. 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
2004]
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In his concurring opinion in McGee,54 for example, Irish Supreme
Court Justice Henchy quoted with approval from the concurring opinion
of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Goldberg in Griswold v. Connecticut,55 in
which Justice Goldberg himself quoted approvingly of the opinion of Mr.
Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ullman to the effect that "the intimacy of husband
and wife is necessarily an essential and accepted feature of the institution
of marriage, an institution which the State not only must allow, but which
always and in every age it has fostered and protected. 56
In dissenting in McGee," Irish Supreme Court Chief Justice Fitzgerald58 59
sought to distinguish Poe v. Ullman," Griswold v. Connecticut, and
Eisentstadt v. Baird.60 He did so by observing that the Irish law forbade
only the importation or sale of the contraceptives at issue, and not their
domestic manufacture or possession. It was theoretically possible (though
highly unlikely), that contraceptives could be manufactured in Ireland and
distributed free of charge. Therefore, Justice Fitzgerald argued that U.S.
Supreme Court cases striking down state laws prohibiting the possession or
distribution of contraceptives were inapposite. Justice Henchy responded
to this argument in his concurring opinion:
It has been argued that Griswold's Case... is distinguishable because
the statute in question there forbade the use of contraceptives, whereas
s. 17 of the Act of 1935 only forbids their sale or importation....
However, I consider that the distinction sought to be drawn is one of
form rather than substance. The purpose of the statute in both cases is
the same: it is to apply the sanction of the criminal law in order to
61prevent the use of contraceptives.
Justice Walsh, in writing the majority opinion for the Irish Supreme
Court, did not refer explicitly to the U.S. Supreme Court cases cited by the
plaintiffs. He explained his reasoning in an apologetic tone:
Three United States Supreme Court decisions were relied upon in
argument by the plaintiff: Poe v. Ullman (1961) 367 U.S. 497; Griswold
v. Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479; and Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) 405
U.S. 438. My reason for not referring to them is not because I did not
find them helpful or relevant, which indeed they were, but because I
54. [1974] I.R. 284 (Ire.).
55. 381 U.S. 479.
56. 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961).
57. [1974] I.R. 284 (Ire.).
58. 367 U.S. 497.
59. 381 U.S. 479.
60. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
61. McGee, [1974] I.R. 284 (Ire.).
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found it unnecessary to rely upon any of the dicta in those cases to
support the views which I have expressed in this judgment. 2
I turn to the Norris63 case; Senator Norris lost his case in the Irish
Supreme Court, which held by a majority that the Irish Constitution did
not prevent criminalization of homosexual acts.
In his dissenting opinion in Norris, Irish Supreme Court Justice
McCarthy cited to decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, particularly to
those concerning a right of privacy, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia,64 Terry v.
Ohio,65 and Griswold v. Connecticut.66 In his majority opinion upholding
the Irish statutes prohibiting same-sex sexual relations, Irish Supreme
Court Chief Justice O'Higgins responded to the dissents of Justices
McCarthy and Henchy, but did not argue that the decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court had no place in a discussion of the legality of Irish statutes
67
under the Irish Constitution.
Finally, in Quinn's Supermarket v. The Attorney General,68 Irish
Supreme Court Justice Walsh cited to a number of U.S. Supreme Court
decisions concerning freedom of religion, including McGowan v.
Maryland,69 Sherberet v. Verner, ° Braunfield v. Brown, and School
District of Abington Township v. Schempp.72 He explored at great length
the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan (a personal friend of Justice
Walsh) in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, and
commented, "The words of Mr. Justice Brennan are very pertinent to the
question at issue in this case."73
Irish Supreme Court Justice Kenny dissented in Quinn's
Supermarket.14  He argued that the first amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and the interpretations thereof in the U.S. Supreme Court
spoke to different issues than those implicated by the Irish Constitution
and the facts in Quinn's Supermarket)5 He did not, however, dismiss out
62. id.
63. [1984] I.R. 36 (Ire.).
64. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
65. 392 U.S. 1 (1978).
66. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
67. See Norris, [1984] I.R. 36 (Ire.).
68. [1972] I.R. 1 (Ire.).
69. 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
70. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
71. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
72. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
73. Quinn's Supermarket, [1972] I.R. I at 11 (Ire.).
74. Id.
75. Id.
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of hand the use of decisions of a court interpreting foreign national law in
interpreting the relevant provisions of the Irish Constitution.
These cases demonstrate a willingness of the Irish Supreme Court,
when interpreting the Irish Constitution, to consider arguments based
upon authority provided by a national court interpreting the provisions of
76foreign national law. Constitutionally, however, foreign national law is in
the same position as international agreements or decisions of international
courts interpreting these agreements. Neither foreign national law nor
international law has been enacted by the Irish legislature. Neither can
become part of the Irish domestic law unless incorporated into Irish law by
Irish legislation. Nevertheless, the Irish Supreme Court remains open to
considering judgments of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Does the Irish Supreme Court display the same willingness towards
decisions of international courts interpreting international law? The
answer is a resounding no. The next section demonstrates that, despite the
fact that neither foreign national law nor international law form part of
Irish domestic law, foreign national law, at least as represented by the
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, enjoys a privileged position in the
Irish Constitutional order.
The Irish Supreme Court has displayed a greater hostility towards
considering decisions of international courts interpreting international law,
at least as represented by decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights.
C. Irish Supreme Court and Decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights
Perhaps the most telling indication of the Irish Supreme Court's
reluctance to consider the relevance of international law in the
interpretation of Irish national law is the virtual absence of any citation of
such law in support of a particular interpretation of the Irish
Constitution 7  In none of the cases considered in the previous section did
any of the Irish Supreme Court Justices cite any decision of the European
76. Indeed, the Irish Courts have been willing to consider decisions of U.S. State Supreme
Courts. In Webb v. Ireland, Justice McCarthy cited with approval a case from Maine, "[iln this
regard I find most persuasive the judgment of Whitehouse J, giving the judgment of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine in Weeks v. Hackett (1908) 71 Atl. Rep. 858 where English and American
authorities up to that date (1908) were cited." [19881 I.R. 353 (Ire.).
77. There are a small number of exceptions to this observation. In both 0 Domhnaill v. Merrick,
[1984] I.R. 151 (Ire.), decided by Justice Hendig and Desmond v. Glackia, [1993] 2 I.R. 43 (Ire.)
decided by Justice O'Hanlon, reference was made to the desirability of reading Irish law in light of
Ireland's obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. Their views have not
prevailed.
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Court of Human Rights in support of a particular construction of the Irish
Constitution.
This lacuna seems particularly anomalous in the Norris71 case. Prior
to the lawsuit in Norris, a plaintiff in Northern Ireland had brought a case
before the European Court of Human Rights challenging Northern
Ireland's laws prohibiting same-sex sexual conduct.79
The laws challenged by Dudgeon were identical to the laws
challenged by David Norris (recall that Ireland inherited United Kingdom
laws existing at the time of the creation of the Irish Free State, including
the British laws that both Norris, and Dudgeon, sought to challenge). By
the time the Irish Supreme Court considered the Norris case, the
European Court of Human Rights had ruled in Dudgeon that the laws at
issue violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Thus, it was a virtual certainty that the European Court of Human Rights
ultimately would reach the same conclusion in the Norris case, and that
Ireland would be forced to amend its criminal laws, as had the United
Kingdom in Northern Ireland.
The basic principle set forth in Article 8 of the Convention that
"[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence,''8 ° is not dissimilar to the largely judicially-created
right of privacy established under the Irish Constitution. Consideration of
decisions by the European Court of Justice concerning interpretation of
this clause, and of limitations on the right of privacy contained in the
subsequent clause of Article 8, would appear relevant to the challenge
brought by Norris. The facts of Norris and Dudgeon were much closer
than the facts of Norris and any of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions that
were considered.
In Norris, the majority opinion by Irish Supreme Court Chief Justice
O'Higgins rejected consideration of the Dudgeon decision out of hand. In
dismissing this suggestion, Justice O'Higgins wrote:
Recently the European Court of Human Rights, which is the
appropriate body to do so under the Convention, interpreted this article
8 on a complaint by Jeffrey Dudgeon, a citizen of Northern Ireland, that
the legislation impugned in this action, which was then in force in
Northern Ireland, interfered with his rights as a homosexual. By a
majority verdict the European Court held that it did so and that,
accordingly, ss. 61 and 62 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861
78. [1984] I.R. 36 (Ire.).
79. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
80. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 46, at art. 8. 1.
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and s. 11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, were inconsistent
with the observance of article 8 of the Convention.
Mrs. Robinson has argued that this decision by the European Court of
Human Rights should he regarded by this Court as something more
than a persuasive precedent and should be followed. She contends that,
since Ireland confirmed and ratified the Convention, there arises a
presumption that the Constitution is compatible with the Convention
and that, in considering a question as to inconsistency under Article 50
of the Constitution, regard should be had to whether the laws being
considered are consistent with the Convention itself. While I appreciate
the clarity of her submission, I must reject it [as] in my view, acceptance
of Mrs. Robinson's submission would be contrary to the provisions of
the Constitution itself and would accord to the Government the power,
by an executive act, to change both the Constitution and the law. The
Convention is an international agreement to which Ireland is a
subscribing party. As such, however, it does not and cannot form part
of our domestic law nor affect in any way questions which arise
thereunder. This is made quite clear by Article 29, s. 6, of the
Constitution which declares:- 'No international agreement shall be part
of the domestic law of the State save as may be determined by the
Oireachtas.' 8'
Chief Justice O'Higgins concluded, "[n]either the Convention on
Human Rights nor the decision of the European Court in Dudgeon v.
United Kingdom (1981) 4 E.H.H.R. 149 is in any way relevant to the
question which we have to consider in this case." '82 At a minimum, for the
reasons given above, this observation is factually inaccurate.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
The refusal by the Irish Supreme Court to expressly consider
international law, such as the European Convention on Human Rights,
may be understandable in light of the dictates of the Irish Constitution.
However, it is less easy to justify the outright dismissal of consideration of
opinions of international courts, such as the European Court of Human
Rights, particularly when they are interpreting concepts very close to those
at issue in the cases before the Irish Supreme Court. In the latter instance,
the Irish Supreme Court is not applying the law as it is contained in the
81. Norris, [1984] I.R. 36 (Ire.).
82. Id.
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international agreement. Instead, the Court is simply informing its view of
some fairly amorphous law by reference to the opinion of international
jurists interpreting similar concepts.
This dismissal of the relevance of the opinions of foreign courts
applying international law is made more difficult to understand when
compared to the ease with which the Irish Supreme Court entertains legal
arguments that cite decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. In the case cited
in my paper, the U.S. Constitution was no more a part of the Irish law than
was the European Convention on Human Rights. The U.S. Supreme
Court is in no better position to influence the interpretation of the Irish
Constitution than is the European Court of Human Rights. Yet in the
cases examined, the Irish Supreme Court implicitly accepted the relevance
of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions, sometimes in quite disparate factual
settings, even while simultaneously dismissing offers to consider opinions
of the European Court of Human Rights that considered the precise
statutory law under consideration by the Irish court.
In addition, the Irish Supreme Court defers entirely to the
interpretations of the European Court of Justice on issues of European
Union law that directly arise in the Irish courts, even against challenges
brought directly under the Irish Constitution. The Irish Supreme Court
asserts that its role in cases involving European Union law consists simply
of applying interpretations provided by the European Court of Justice.
The express provisions of the Irish Constitution provide a partial
explanation for the difference in attitudes. This is particularly true in the
case law of the European Union, where the Irish Constitution expressly
provides for the direct effect and supremacy of such law over Irish law,
including Irish Constitutional law. However, in Campus Oil,3 we see the
Irish Supreme Court granting greater deference than that formally
required under European Union law.
The conflicting attitudes to the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
and the European Court of Human Rights cannot be so readily explained
by reference to the Irish Constitution. Although the Irish Constitution
does not contain an express provision regarding foreign national law (as it
does regarding international agreements), the Irish Constitution implicitly
contains prohibitions to giving effect to laws as announced by the U.S.
Supreme Court. Yet the Irish Supreme Court considers decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court almost as if these were prior precedents of the Irish
Supreme Court itself.
The next section attempts to provide an explanation for this
difference in approach by the Irish Supreme Court. It argues that the
83. [1983] I.R. 88 (Ire.).
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difference depends upon the unstated relationship between the Irish
Supreme Court and the other courts whose decisions are offered for
consideration.
B. A Question of Horizontal and Vertical Relationships?
1. Introduction
The explanation for the apparently inconsistent approach of the Irish
Supreme Court to consideration of decisions by "foreign" courts, such as
the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and
the U.S. Supreme Court, may lie in the unstated relationship between the
Irish Supreme Court and these other courts. Related to this unstated
perception of the relationship between these courts is the possibility that
another court might comment directly upon the interpretation of law given
by the Irish Supreme Court.
Where the relationship between the Irish court and the "foreign"
court is horizontal, the Irish Supreme Court is open to considering the
decisions of the foreign court. Where the relationship is vertical, the Court
is hostile to considering the opinion of the foreign court. Where the
relationship is horizontal, there is little or no possibility that the foreign
court will comment directly on an interpretation of law given by the Irish
Supreme Court. Where the relationship is vertical, there is the possibility
that the foreign court may comment upon, and disagree with, the opinion
given by the Irish Supreme Court. In some sense, the willingness or lack of
willingness to consider foreign judgments may be a function of the Irish
Supreme Court's collective fear of being criticized in its interpretation of
the law at issue.
2. Irish Supreme Court and European Court of Human Rights - A
Vertical Relationship
The relationship between the Irish Supreme Court and the European
Court of Human Rights can be characterized as a vertical relationship.
This means that the European Court of Human Rights would be in a
position, in a proper case, to comment directly upon and potentially
criticize the Irish Supreme Court in its interpretation of, for example, the
European Convention on Human Rights. If this is true, then the Irish
Supreme Court would be reluctant to entertain arguments based on
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights interpreting the
European Convention.
The European Convention on Human Rights allows individuals to
bring claims against a Contracting Party, such as Ireland, directly before
[Vol. 12:1
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the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. 4 However, two conditions must
be satisfied. First, the Contracting Party must have agreed to allow itself
to be sued in Strasbourg. 5 Second, the person bringing the complaint must
have exhausted domestic remedies.8' That is, the complaining party must
first pursue a claim in the domestic courts under the domestic law of the
Contracting Party before having recourse to a direct action in Strasbourg.
Depending upon the Constitutional position of the Contracting Party, the
domestic law may include the European Convention on Human Rights,
and the complaining party may be able to rely directly upon the
Convention in the domestic courts.
It has not been possible heretofore to raise the Convention directly in
Irish courts, due to the dualist nature of the Irish Constitutional legal order
(Ireland recently "incorporated" the convention into domestic law, but this
does not affect the analysis herein). That does not prevent the Irish
Supreme Court, when interpreting the Irish Constitution, from considering
arguments by analogy to similar principles contained in the Convention, or
from considering interpretations of these principles by the European Court
of Human Rights. The Irish Supreme Court is restrained only from
directly applying the terms of this international agreement in its rulings.
The Irish Supreme Court might, for example, decide in the course of
interpreting the scope of the Irish right of privacy in family life to examine
the corresponding right under the European Convention on Human
Rights. Its decision on the Irish Constitution might then be influenced by
its view of what another court might rule in applying a similar principle.
If a party were aggrieved by the decision of the Irish Supreme Court,
that party would have a right to pursue an independent action in the
European Court of Human Rights.87 In the course of its ruling, the
European Court of Human Rights might adopt a different ruling with
respect to the Article of the Convention at issue, or comment directly on
the interpretation of that Article by the Irish Supreme Court.
The Irish Supreme Court, hypothetically, might conclude that Article
8 of the European Conventions8 did not create a right of transsexuals to
alter their birth certificates in order to allow them to marry a member of
their post-operative, opposite sex. The Irish Supreme Court might
interpret the Irish Constitution to lack such a right based, in part, on
reasoning by analogy to the corresponding right of privacy in the
84. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 46, at art. 34.
85. Id.
86. Id. at art. 35, § 1.
87. Id. at art. 34.
88. Id. at art. 8.
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European Convention. The complainant, having exhausted domestic
remedies, would be able to pursue the claim before the European Court of
Human Rights. 9 In the course of that subsequent ruling, the Court of
Human Rights might give a conflicting interpretation to Article 8, in effect
"overruling" the Irish Supreme Court.
The Irish Supreme Court, at least in the cases cited above, has
behaved consistently with the above premise. In none of the cases did any
of the justices cite to principles arising under the European Convention on
Human Rights, even though the Convention contains articles dealing
directly with a right of privacy and freedom of religion. Ireland is a
signatory to the Convention and has committed to abide by its principles.
In the Norris case, the European Court had considered the precise statute
challenged in the Irish Supreme Court. The only comment by a justice of
the Supreme Court in these cases was that the Convention and the
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights were "irrelevant,"
which, at a minimum, is factually inaccurate °
3. Irish Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court - A Horizontal
Relationship
The Irish Supreme Court has shown itself willing to consider
arguments based on decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court when
interpreting arguably analogous provisions of the Irish Constitution. This
willingness contrasts starkly with the outright rejection of citation to
authority of the European Court of Human Rights. The Irish
Constitutional position of decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court is
approximately the same as that of decisions of international courts such as
the European Court of Human Rights. Thus, the Irish Constitution itself
fails to completely explain the apparent inconsistency.
If the relationship between the Irish Supreme Court and the U.S.
Supreme Court is placed on a vertical-horizontal axis, however, the
attitude of the Irish Supreme Court does not appear inconsistent. The
relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and the Irish Supreme Court
appears to be horizontal, at least in the sense that there is little or no
likelihood of the U.S. Supreme Court commenting upon or disagreeing
with the interpretation by the Irish Supreme Court of rights arising under
the U.S. Constitution. A claimant aggrieved by a decision of the Irish
Supreme Court obviously is unable to bring a claim before the U.S.
Supreme Court. The decision of the Irish Supreme Court on an
89. Id. at art. 35, § 1.
90. See Norris, [1984] I.R. 36 (Ire.).
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interpretation of a right arising under the U.S. Constitution is unlikely ever
to come to the attention of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Thus, if the willingness of the Irish Supreme Court to consider the
decisions of a foreign court is influenced, in part, by the unstated
horizontal or vertical nature of the relationship between the courts, the
Irish Supreme Court should show a greater willingness to consider
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. In the cases considered above, this
in fact was the case. The justices of the Irish Supreme Court approached
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court as if they were previous decisions of
the Irish Supreme Court. They employed the same judicial interpretive
techniques as they would in interpreting decisions of Irish courts. Not a
single judge suggested that, due to the Constitutional position of foreign
law, it was inappropriate to entertain arguments based on decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court
4. The Irish Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice - A
Horizontal Relationship?
A superficial anomaly appears in the relationship between the Irish
Court and the European Court of Justice. The Irish Supreme Court shows
the greatest deference to decisions of the European Court of Justice.
However, under the Irish Constitution, the law of the European Union is
supreme to Irish law, including Irish Constitutional law.91 This might be
perceived as establishing a vertical, rather than a horizontal relationship
between the Irish Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice. If
the relationship between these courts was vertical, we might expect to see
reluctance to consider rulings of the European Court of Justice,
notwithstanding the Constitutional position of European Union law.
A closer examination of the mechanics of the interrelationship
between the Irish Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice
reveals that their relationship exists on a horizontal rather than a vertical
plane. The willingness of the Irish Supreme Court to consider decisions of
the European Court of Justice, buttressed by the Irish Constitution, is
consistent with the notion that it is the vertical or horizontal nature of the
relationship between the Irish Supreme Court and the foreign court that
influences the willingness to consider foreign judgments.
Article 234 (previously Article 177) of the European Community
Treaty establishes a horizontal relationship between the Irish Supreme
Court and the European Court of Justice."' This Article provides that if
any issue of European Union law arises in an Irish court or tribunal, that
91. Art. 29.10, Constitution of Ireland, 1937.
92. EEC Treaty, supra note 22, at art. 234.
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court may make a preliminary reference to the European Court of
Justice.93 If that issue of European Union law arises in a case before the
Irish Supreme Court, the Irish Supreme Court must make a preliminary
reference to the European Court of Justice. 4
The reference is "preliminary" because the European Court of Justice
does not adjudicate the dispute giving rise to the need for interpreting the
law of the European Union. The European Court of Justice does not
enter a final judgment. The European Court of Justice gives an
interpretation of the law, and returns the ruling to the Irish Supreme Court
for application in the particular case. The Irish Court applies the ruling
and enters judgment.
This is not an appellate process, which would imply a vertical
relationship between the courts. The decision whether to make a
reference to the European Court of Justice rests entirely with the court,
and not with the parties. The propriety of making or not making a
reference to the European Court of Justice cannot be appealed to the
European Court of Justice. In Ireland, the order making or refusing a
preliminary reference cannot be appealed in the national courts.
After the preliminary ruling has been sent to and applied by the Irish
Supreme Court, a party cannot appeal that application to the European
Court of Justice. If the parties believe that the Irish Supreme Court has
misapplied the ruling they are without a remedy to the European Court of
Justice. In theory, if the Irish Supreme Court consistently refused to make
a preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice or consistently
misapplied (or ignored) preliminary rulings by the European Court of
Justice, the European Commission could prosecute Ireland before the
European Court of Justice. Ireland might be subject to fines for the
Court's malfeasance. The likelihood of this occurring is extremely remote.
The relationship between the Irish Supreme Court and the European
Court of Justice is horizontal, despite the supremacy of European Union
law in the Irish Constitutional order. There is no chance that the
European Court of Justice will directly comment upon or criticize a ruling
of the Irish Supreme Court applying the law of the European Union. The
Irish court is not under the watchful eye of the European Court of Justice
in the sense that an inferior court in a vertical relationship may be
criticized by a higher court for an erroneous interpretation of law. In one
sense, the Irish Supreme Court is on the same level as the European Court
of Justice.
93. Id.
94. Art. 29.10, Constitution of Ireland, 1937.
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The behavior of the Irish Supreme Court is therefore consistent with
the premise that the willingness of the Irish Supreme Court to consider the
decision of a "foreign" court depends in part upon whether the Irish Court
is in a vertical or horizontal relationship with that court.
VI. CONCLUSION
My paper has sought to bring some coherence to the attitude of the
Irish Supreme Court towards considering opinions of foreign courts. From
an Irish perspective, the decisions of courts applying foreign law can be
divided into three parts: courts applying foreign national law, courts
applying supranational law, and courts applying international law. The
Irish Constitution places foreign national law and international law in
roughly the same category relative to their suitability as sources of law in
the interpretation of the Irish Constitution. Supranational law occupies a
privileged position in the Irish Constitutional legal order. The Irish
Supreme Court appears willing to consider decisions of courts applying
supranational law and courts applying foreign national law, while rejecting
the relevance of decisions of courts applying international law. This
approach is inconsistent when viewed strictly from an Irish Constitutional
perspective.
I have suggested that the approach of the Irish Supreme Court to
decisions of foreign courts is consistent if the relationship of the Irish
Court to the foreign court is placed on a vertical-horizontal axis. Where
the relationship between the Irish Supreme Court and the foreign court is
vertical, in the sense that the foreign court can comment directly upon and
criticize the Irish Supreme Court's interpretation of foreign law, the Irish
Supreme Court is hostile to the offer of opinions of these foreign courts as
a source of authority when considering interpretations of the Irish
Supreme Court. Where the relationship between the Irish Court and the
foreign court is horizontal, in the sense that there is little or no likelihood
of a direct criticism of the Irish Supreme Court's interpretation of foreign
law, the Irish Court is open to offers of foreign authority in interpreting
the Irish Constitution.
In several cases before the Irish Supreme Court, Norris v. The
Attorney General,95 McGee v. The Attorney General,96 Campus Oil v.
Ministry of Industry & Energy,97 Campus Oil v. Ministry of Industry (No.
95. [19841 I.R. 36 (Ire.).
96. [1974] I.R. 284 (Ire.).
97. [1983] I.R. 83 (Ire.).
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2),"" and Quinn's Supermarket v. The Attorney General,99 the Justices of the
Irish Supreme Court behaved consistently with the foregoing premise.
They rejected opinions of the European Court of Human Rights, which
occupies a vertical relationship with the Irish Supreme Court. They were
open to opinions of the European Court of Justice and the U.S. Supreme
Court, which occupy a horizontal relationship with the Irish Supreme
Court. These observations suggest that it may be a fear of contradiction
which underpins the reluctance of the Irish Supreme Court to consider
opinions of, for example, the European Court of Human Rights.
Do these observations offer any insight into the willingness of the U.S.
Supreme Court to consider opinions of foreign courts, such as the
European Court of Human Rights, when examining issues arising under
the U.S. Constitution? If my theory is correct in the context of the Irish
Supreme Court, and applies to other Constitutional courts, it may suggest
that, at the heart of opposition to consideration of opinions of some
foreign courts is a lack of confidence in the relationship between these
courts, and a fear of criticism. If a Justice saw a foreign court as a "sister"
court in the sense of occupying the same hierarchal position on a vertical-
horizontal plane, that Justice might be willing to consider opinions of this
foreign court in interpreting analogous provisions of the U.S. Constitution.
If a Justice saw a foreign court as occupying a vertical position relative to
the U.S. Supreme Court, or feared criticism of this court in interpreting
this court's decisions, a Justice might exhibit hostility towards the notion of
considering that court's opinions in interpreting analogous provisions of
the U.S. Constitution. Ironically, it may be the case that those U.S.
Supreme Court Justices most hostile to considering decisions of foreign
courts are those Justice's who view the foreign courts as occupying a
superior position in a hierarchy of legal norms.
98. [1983] I.R. 88 (Ire.).
99. [1972] I.R. 1 (Ire.).
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